COST-OF-LIVING ESCALATORS IN MAJOR UNION CONTRACTS DAVID CARD*
This paper analyzes the price-indexation provisions of a sample of major Canadian collective bargaining agreements concluded between 1968 and 1975 . Under these contracts, escalated wage increases comprised about one-third of total wage increases and represented a major source of erosion in the relative wages of skilled workers. The author argues that indexation provisions are usefully characterized by the marginal elasticity of the contractual wage rate to increases in prices. Measures of this responsiveness indicate that, on average, contractual wage rates are only slightly less than unit elastic with respect to price increases. There is considerable variation across industries, however, in the extent to which wages respond to price changes. W AGE-INDEXATION provisions are convalue of the wage package negotiated at the tained in a substantial portion of start of the ~o n t r a c t .~ major union contracts.' Cost-of-living escaThis interpretation, however, immelators are therefore an important determidiately raises two questions: why are the nant of the evolution of wages at the noncontingent wage increases announced contract level and of the behavior of in some indexed contracts so large, and why aggregate wages.' One interpretation of the are the wage gains attributed to indexation role of cost-of-living wage increases in longover the life of the contract so low, relative term contracts is that they protect the real to price increases over the same period? For Review, Vol. 37, No. 1 (October 1983) . O 1983 by Cornell University.
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0019-7939/83/3701 $01.00 example, the ratio of escalated wage increases to the percent increase in prices over the life of the contract is typically onehalf or less.4 At the same time, a comparison of indexed and nonindexed contracts reveals onlv small differences between the size of noncontingent increases announced at the signing dates of the two types of contracts.
This paper argues that both questions are easily answered once the substitutability of contingent and noncontingent wage increases is recognized. A new set of measures of the responsil tness of indexed wage changes to concurrent price changes is then constructed for a s a m~l e of Canadian labor contracts. These measures reveal two important facts about cost-ofliving escalation provisions in long-term contracts. First, the marginal elasticity of wages with respect to prices is much higher than indicated by previous ~t u d i e s .~ Second, there are significant differences in the responsiveness of escalated wage increases to price increases across different industries. Both findings are potentially important in understanding the microeconomic and macroeconomic implications of indexation. ' 
Characteristics of Indexation Provisions
Indexation provisions in long-term union contracts share a number of common features. First, in a substantial number of indexed contracts. the escalation formula is restricted in some way: either by limiting the range of prices over which the escalator is operative or by specifying a maximum or minimum wage change to result from price escalation. Table 1 reports the incidence of these kinds of restrictions in a sample of 281 major Canadian contracts written between 1968 and 1975.7 For comparative purposes, the table provides detail by year of settlement, industry, and union.
One widespread restriction is the specification of a maximum absolute escalated wage increase. Provisions of this nature U were included in 35 percent of the contracts and turned out to place a limit on the size of cost-of-living wage increases in 91 percent of cases. Although the proportion of contracts with ceilings (or caps) on escalation increases shows some variation over time and across industries, the proportion of cap provisions that actually limited contingent wage increases ex post facto was fairly stable. Caps were less common among nonman~facturin~ contracts and among contracts signed by the United Automobile Workers (UAW). They were more common in the basic iron and steel industries and among contracts signed by the United Steelworkers (USW).
Provisions to delay the start of escalation until the second or third year of the contract are also widespread. of this kind were included in 35 percent of to this scheme, escalated wage increases are the contracts overall, although in only 19 based on increases in the price level up to percent of the contracts signed by the UAW. some date preceding the end of the In contrast to a specific time delay in the contract. Overall, 23 percent of the constart of indexation, some escalation clauses tracts specified such a final date for base index-linked wage adjustments on the calculation of contingent wage increase^.^ increase in prices over and above a Provisions of this kind were relatively preannounced trigger price level. Trigger common in nonmanufacturing induiprices were specified in 13 percent of the contracts overall, although in relatively be the last review period. Table 2 reports average contingent and noncontingent increases in the base wage rate over the life of the contract for the Canadian contract sample." Noncontingent increases are broken out into two components: increases taking effect at ''Douty, "Cost of Living Escalator Clauses," Table 9 , p. 31.
"The base rate is the wage rate of the lowest-paid workers in the bargaining unit and typically reflects the wage rate of janitors and cleaners in manufacturing contracts. A breakdown of the relative components of the start of the contract and deferred increases. Also reported are the proportion of contingent increases to total increases over the life of the contract and the proportion of contingent increases to total deferred increases. Finally, in an analysis of the impact of deferred components on real wage changes, total contingent increases and noncontingent deferred increases are expressed as fractions of the percent increases in prices during the contract period.
For the sample as a whole, the average annual rate of increase of base wage rates over the life of the contract was 16.8 percent.12 This number reflects in part the wage change for other rates in the contract would be roughly similar, although only base wage rates and the highest contractual wage rate are available for most of the contracts in the sample.
'Wilton, "An Analysis of Canadian Contract Data," Table 7 , p. 19, reports average annual percentage high rate of inflation experienced in Canada during the sample period, in part the significant growth of real base wage rates during the period, and in part the large "catch up" increases awarded in many contracts simed in the later vears of the u sample period. Slightly more than onethird of nominal wage increases took the form of increases effective at the signing date of the contract, whereas a slightly smaller share of increases were in the form of noncontingent deferred increases. Averaged over all contracts. the share of " wage increases resulting from contingent escalation increases was about one-third; but the relative shares of contingent and noncontingent increases shows some significant variability by union and by industry. In particular, in contracts in the automobile parts and assembly industries, and in contracts simed bv the UAW, the share of u total increases resulting from contingent increases is relatively high.
The last two columns of Table 2 indicate the percent increase in wages resulting from noncontingent deferred increases and realized contingent increases, respectively, as fractions of the percent increase in prices over the contract period.I3 For the sample as a whole, these two fractions sum to about 1.1. On average, total deferred increases maintained and in fact increased the real value of the wage increases incorporated at the signing date of the contract. Further, although the values of the two fractions show considerable dispersion by industry and by union, their sum is less variable, suggesting that the two forms of deferred increases can be viewed as alternative increases in the base wage rates of major nonescalated contracts signed from 1968 to 1975 as follows: 1968, 7.2 percent; 1969, 8.0 percent; 1970, 8.3 percent; 1971, 8.1 percent; 1972, 9.6 percent; 1973, 11.1 percent; 1974, 14.6 percent; 1975, 17 .7 percent. His figures for the escalated contracts (based on a slightly larger sample than the one in this paper) are very similar to the figures obtained by summing the first three columns of Table 2 by year. Apparently, workers in escalated contracts fared somewhat better than their counterparts in nonescalated contracts throughout the sample period.
'!In these two columns only, deferred noncontingent and contingent increases are expressed as percentages of the base wage rate at the start of the current contract, rather than the base wage rate at the end of the previous contract.
means of offsetting price increases over the life of the contract." Although different unions and different industries rely to a greater or lesser extent on contingent or noncontingent deferred increases, the net effect of total deferred increases is more nearly constant.
A third common feature of manv indexed contracts is the ~rovision for a fixed, absolute increment to each worker's wagein response to a given absolute increase in the price level. In fact, 94 percent of the contracts in the s a m~l e s~ecified escalation 1 L formulas of this type.I5 Indexation rules that translate absolute price increases into absolute wage increases have two important properties. On the one hand, since they generate the same cost-of-living adjustment for all wage rates in the contract, the proportional increase in the unskilled wage rate exceeds the proportional increase in the skilled wage rate. This in turn implies that skill differentials will be steadily eroded during the course of indexation.I6 On the othe; hand, escalation formulas that link absolute wage increases to absolute mice increases do not exhibit a constant proportional responsiveness of wages to prices during the course of indexation.I7
I4Of course, noncontingent deferred increases may play other roles in the contract. For example, most of the automobile assembly contracts in the sample included across-the-board noncontingent deferred increases of 3 percent per year, presumably to reflect desired real wage growth in response to improving productivity.
15Douty "A nonproportional indexation formula gives the wage rate as the sum of the noncontingent wage (wn) and a cost-of-living increment that is proportional to Some evidence of the impact of cost-ofliving wage adjustments on relative skill differentials is presented in Table 3 , which analyzes the evolution of the ratio of the highest contractual wage rate to the base wage rate over the life of the contract.I8 The percent change in the ratio of high-skilled to low-skilled wage rates is approximately the sum of three components: the difference between the percent increases in high-skilled and low-skilled wage rates awarded at the signing date; the difference between the percent increases in highskilled and low-skilled wage rates resulting the increase in prices from the start of escalation: w = w, + a@ -pa),where a is contractually specified. The elasticity of wages with respect to pricesis e = a p / [ w , + a@ -pa)], which is increasing or decreasing in p as a is less than or greater than w,/p,.
I8The data preclude analysis of wage rates other than the base wage rate and the highest contractual wage rate. In most contracts, the highest wage rate is paid to workers in the skilled trades, such as maintenance electricians and tool and die makers.
Increases Increases from deferred increases; and the difference between the percent increases in highskilled and low-skilled wage rates resulting from escalated wage increases. For the sample as a whole, the relative wage of skilled workers declined at an annual rate of 2.7 percent per year. On average, about one-half of the decline in relative wage rates of skilled workers was attributable to nonproportional escalation, while the other half was attributable to lessthan-proportional noncontingent increases for more-highly-paid workers. The rate of decay in the relative wage rate of skilled workers was fairly constant across industries and unions, althbugh, not surprisingly, the contributions of the three components of wage change were more In nonmanufacturing contracts, noncontingent, nondeferred increases were a more important source of relative wage erosion, whereas in UAW contracts, increases at the Start of the contract tended to be proportional. Table 3 also indicates a more rapid decline in the relative wages of skilled workers in the later sample period. That change was mainly the result of the larger cost-of-living adjustments in the period after 1972, although noncontingent wage increases also contributed to the more rapid decline of relative skilled rates in the later sample period.
Escalated labor contracts thus have three im~ortant features in common: the inclusion of noncontingent wage increases; restrictions on the range of price and wage movements covered by escalation; and formulas that yield equal absolute increments to workers at all skill levels. As the data in Tables 1 through 3 illustrate, however, there is considerable diversitv of detail within the general framework A f a typical escalated contract. For example, one interesting feature of the data is the svstematic difference between UAW and usw contracts. Although contracts in the automobile parts and assembly industries tended to follow the pattern of the original General Motors-UAW escalated contracts, and rely heavily on contingent cost-ofliving adjustments as a source of inflationary wage adjustments during the life of the contract, USW contracts were more likely to delay indexation, include larger noncontingent, deferred increases, and rely less on contingent wage adjustments to offset inflation during the contract period.
The diversity of indexed contracts has an important implication for the interpretation of escalated wage increases. Realized escalated wage changesdepend both on the responsiveness of wages to prices during the course of indexation and on the delav provisions and other restrictions in the escalation clause. In contracts with delayed escalation, part of the increase in prices over the contract period is covered by escalated increases, and part is covered by the noncontingent increases announced at the signing of the contract in anticipation of the increase in prices. Hence, it is not surprising that the ratio of escalated wage increases to realized price increases over the life of the contract is, on average, something less than unity. This ratio, which has been described as an ex ~o s t elasticitv of indexation, provides very little information on the actual responsiveness of indexed wage changes to price increases. Since this responsiveness is what is typically described by theoretical models of indexation, some alternative characterization of escalation provisions is clearly desirable.Ig
Interpreting the Indexation Provisions
Following the description of typical escalation formulas offered in the previous section, the level of the wage rate in period t of an indexed labor contract can be written as:
(1)
where w(0) is the wage rate at the signing date (incorporating noncontingent, nondeferred increases);n(t) is the level of deferred noncontingent increasesin period t; c is the cap amount or maximum increase allowed by indexation; a is the contractually specifiedincreasein wage rates per point increase in prices; p(t) is the price level in period t; and p(s) is the price level at the start of indexati~n.~' A complete specification of the contract amounts to a specification of w(O), n(t), c, a , and p(s). In contracts with delayed escalation, p(s) is the price level at some future date, s, which is uncertain ex ante. On the other hand, in contracts that announce a trigger price p*,p(s) is fixed ex ante at p*. In these contracts, however, the exact date at which indexation will commence is uncertain. This in turn implies 'gConfusionbetween the ex post elasticity of indexation and the point responsiveness of index-linkedwage increases to concurrent price increases accounts for a puzzle raised in a recent study of wage determination, that the wage rate at the start of indexation is uncertain at the signing date of a triggered contract.
One interpretation of this formula is that it represents a piecewise linear approximation to a constant-elasticity wage-price sched~le.~' Let e* indicate the desired proportional responsiveness of wages to prices. Figure 1 illustrates the desired and actual wage-price schedules over the contract period, under the assumptions that indexation is delayed for one period, p(s) = p(1); that escalated wage increases are capped; and that e* < 1. Treating the observed indexation rule as an approximation to a constant-elasticity rule requires that the two formulas yield approximately the same wage rates, at least in some relevant range of prices. If e* is not too far from unity and the range of prices over the life of the contract is relativelv small. the deviation of the actual wage path from the desired path can be kept This suggests that the desired elasticity of indexation can be estimated bv the marginal elasticity of the cost-of-iivingadjustment formula during the course of indexation. This marginal elasticity is: if the escalator is operative, and equals zero if otherwise. Define e(0) as a p(O)/w(O), and observe that: whenever the escalator is operative. The elasticity of indexation in any period differs from e(0) to the extent that real wages have risen or fallen since the signing date of the 21Since many simple models of indexation are characterized by a single parameter-the elasticity of wages with respect to prices-it is useful to have an interpretation of observed escalation formulas in terms of such a single-parameter model. At the very least, such an interpretation provides a framework for organizing the empirical content of a sample of escalated contracts. 221fe* = 1, the desired wage schedule is a linear function of p.
contract. If intracontract real wage changes are small, e(0) is likely to be a reasonable estimator of the desired elasticity, e* . Furthermore, since e(0) is simply the ratio of the "cents per point" awarded by the escalator to the real contractual wage rate at the start of the contract, it is easily constructed from observable contract data.
P r i c e Level An alternative estimator can be obtained by assuming that the desired and actual wage-price schedules correspond exactly at some wage-price pair. In particular, as illustrated in Figure 1 , assume that the desired and actual schedules coincide when prices and wages are equal to their expected values at the start of indexation. Define e = a E~(s)]/E[w(s)] as the expected marginal elasticity at the start of i n d e x a t i~n .~Given expectations on the path of prices over the contract period, e ' can be constructed as an alternative estimator of e*.24
The marginal elasticity of the cost-ofliving-adjustment clause is one plausible 25Stri~tly speaking, e'is the expected elasticity at the start of
indexation if and only if E[P(s)/w(s)]= E[p(s)]/ E[w(s)l.
24There is, in fact, a family of estimators corresponding to different assumptions about the coincidence of the desired and actual wage schedules. An alternative estimator could be obtained by assuming that the escalator formula is designed to minimize some expected distance from the desired constant elasticity formula.
estimator of the desired elasticitv of indexation. On the other hand, it' has been suggested that the marginal elasticity of indexation is likely to overstate the desired elasticity of indexation in contracts that are capped or delayed.25 According to this interpretation, caps in particular are designed by the contracting parties to limit the yields of overly generous escalators. This view unambiguously predicts that cam are more likelv in contracts with higher marginal elasticities. Figure 1 clearly suggests, however, that the role of caps in the framework adopted here is to limit the contingent wage increases in contracts where the desired and marginal elasticities of indexation are relatively low, yielding the prediction that caps are more likelv in contracts with lower mareinal elashcities. In fact, the incidence of tips is negatively correlated with the marginal elasticitv of i n d e x a t i~n .~~ Although this fact " alone cannot distinguish the "correct" interpretation of observed indexation formulas, it does provide some evidence in favor of the framework adopted in this paper. In contrast to the marginal elasticities e(0)and e ' , the ex post elasticity defined in the last section depends on the presence or absence of restrictions on the escalation formula. From the general formula for the wage rate under escalation, the ex post elasticity is given by: The assumption that an observed indexation formula approximates a desired constant-elasticity wage function leaves unanswered the question of how the delay in indexation is determined. One possibility is that delay provisions are designed to limit contingent wage increases in contracts with relatively high marginal elasticities of indexation. Consistent with the interpretation of marginal elasticities as desired elasticities, however, the sample correlation of the incidence of delay provisions with the size of the marginal elasticity is essentially zero.27 On the other hand, if workers are strongly attached to firms, then the timing of inflationary wage increments has a relatively small impact on the allocative efficiency of the contract. Longer delays in indexation, in combination with larger noncontingent deferred increases, may be tolerated in order to satisfy other objectives of the contract. One hypothesis in this regard is that union leaders prefer larger noncontingent increases and smaller contingent increases in order to emphasize their own role in wage determination and to deemphasize the role of automatic wage adjustment^.^^ An alternative hypothesis is that since cost-of-living wage adjustments tend to distort the relative wage structure of the contract, there is an incentive to reduce their importance in the overall wagedetermination process. This hypothesis is consistent with the fact that the relative share of contingent wage increases in total wage increases is negatively correlated with the size of the maximum relative wage -2'The correlation of the marginal elasticity of base wage rates with the incidence of delay provisions is 0.04 and insignificantly different from zero at the 25 percent level.
28The problems posed for union security by automatic wage-adjustment formulas were apparently recognized in the first escalated General Motors -UAW contract. In that contract, GM assented to a form of the union shop for the first time. See Garbarino, Wage Policy and Long Term Contracts, p. 62. differential observed in the contract.29 The hypothesis does not address, however, the more fundamental question of why cost-ofliving escalation provisions typically generate the same absolute wage adjustment for workers at every skill level.
Consideration of the nonproportionality of many escalation clauses introduces an additional difficulty in the interpretation of observed indexation formulas. Let w,(t) and w2(t) represent the wage rates of unskilled and skilled workers, respectively, and let U ( t ) represent the skill-weighted geometric mean of w,(t)and w,(t).Without a formal model of the aggregation of heterogeneous workers' preferences, it is natural to assume that observed indexation provisions represent an average of the provisions that different groups would prefer in isolation. Define the skill-specific analogues of e(0) and e ' as: Under the assumption that a is determined ex ante as a geometric average of the derivatives appropriate for unskilled and skilled workers, 8'can be interpreted as a geometric average of the desired ex ante elasticities of the two groups of workers.30 On the other hand, if the majority of the union members are unskilled, union policy regarding escalation may be determined 2gThe correlation over the 281 contracts is -.12. Since wage differentials in the steel industries tend to be larger than those in the automotive industries, this is also consistent with the greater importance of contingent wage adjustments in UAW contracts than in USW contracts. 3oSuppose log(a) = (1 -v) log (a,) + v log(a,), where v is the proportion of skilled workers, and a, and a, are the derivatives of wages with respect to prices desired by the two groups. If efand eQare the desired elasticities of unskilled and skilled workers' wages, respectively, and if the observed and desired wage schedules correspond at the start of indexation, then log 2' = (1 -v) log(ea
entirely by the preferences of unskilled workers. In that case, the marginal elasticity of unskilled workers' wages can be interpreted as an estimate of the desired responsiveness of unskilled wages to prices.
Responsiveness of Wages to Prices
During Indexation This section analyzes sample distributions of the measures of the marginal elasticity of indexation proposed in the previous section. The measures that depend on the levels of wages and prices at the start of the contract were constructed dire~tly.~' The measures that depend on expected wage rates and price levels at the start of indexation required calculating expected inflation rates by year. The details of these calculations are reported in the appendix. Table 4 summarizes the distributions of six different measures of the marginal elasticity, corresponding to the unskilled, skilled, and average-wage-rate elasticities, as measured at the start of the contract and at the start of indexation. For comparative purposes, ex post elasticities are also reported. Of particular interest are two features shared by all six measures of the marginal elasticity of indexation: the relatively high estimated elasticities and the dispersion of elasticities across different industries. As expected, elasticities defined relative to real wage rates at the start of the contract are similar to elasticities defined relative to expected real wage rates at the start of indexation.
31To construct the skill-weighted average elasticities, it is necessary to estimate the proportions of skilled and unskilled workers by contract. Since the contract data do not report employment levels, contracts were matched to three-digit SICS, and industry skill proportions were calculated. For lack of suitable Canadian data, skill proportions were computed by industry for three-digit U.S. industries and then matched to the contract data by matching Canadian and U.S. industry classifications. The proportion of skilled workers is taken to be the proportion of craft employment to the total employment of crafts workers, operatives, and laborers, by industry, as reported in the 1970 U.S. Census. A comparison of the estimated skill proportions with estimated skill proportions for manufacturing industries constructed directly from unpublished Canadian census data by Michael Abbott revealed only minor discrepancies. The average estimate of the marginal elasticity of base wage rates and the elasticity of indexation of the base wage marginal elasticity of base wage rates, e, rates is .92. clearlv much =eater than the (O), are illustrated in Figures 2 and 3. " average ex post elasticity of .54. The Whereas the distribution of ex post elastiaverage estimate of the marginal elasticity cities is highly skewed to the left, the of indexation of the combined wages of distribution of the marginal elasticity has a skilled and unskilled workers is .83. ADmore nearly symmetric shape about its I proximately 12 percent of all escalators modal value of 0.95. The presence of yield greater than unit-elastic responsiveescalators with delays, caps, and other ness of combined wages to the CPI.
restrictions is indicated by the concentraMarginal elasticities are lowest in the basic tion of ex post elasticities in the interval ironuand steel industries and highest in between zero and the minimum of the nonmanufacturing industries, where about marginal elasticity of the base wage rates.32 20 percent of the escalators exhibit a
The presence of a small number of greater than unit-elastic responsiveness of contracts with proportional and unitcombined wages to prices. Observe that elastic escalation provisions (most of which marginal elasticities in UAW and USW are from nonmanufacturing industries) contracts are similar, in spite of the noted increases the sample density of e, (0) at the dissimilarities in the contracts of the two unit-elastic point.33 unions in other respects. This similarity suggests that the dispersion in desired s2Recall that in the absence of restrictions, the ex post elasticities of indexation mav be among " elasticity of base wage rates is equal to e,(O).
industries, rather than among unions. As Figure 3 illustrates, there is a wide range in the measured marginal elasticity of indexation of contractual base wage rates. In fact, this is a characteristic of all six elasticity measures. The data in Table 4 suggest that the dispersion in measures of the marginal elasticity of indexation may be the result of differences across industries in the desired responsiveness of wages to prices during the course of indexation. On elasticity of unity. In contracts with proportional indexation, all six marginal-elasticity measures are equal. Even contracts that specify a one percent increase in all wage rates for each one percent increase in the CPI do not necessarily yield ex post elasticities equal to unity in the presence of restrictions on escalation. One-half of the contracts with proportional indexation provisions were either delayed or capped. the other hand, the same data also indicate substantial differences among indexation provisions in contracts negotiated in different years. A number of hypotheses can be addressed by analyzing the variance in measures of the elasticity of indexation and by controlling for interindustry differences in mean elasticities. First, are there statistically significant differences in elasticities among industries? Second, can differences in elasticities by year be explained by the industry composition of contracts signed in each year? Third, do particular unions systematically influence marginal escalation elasticities? Fourth, what additional factors influence the within-industrv dispersion of marginal escalation elasticities? Table 5 reports an analysis of variance of the six marginal elasticity measures. Interindustry difference~ are captured by a set of 60 fixed effects by three-digit industry. As the first row of the table indicates, about 96 percent of the variation in the marginalelasticity measures is attributable to interindustry difference~. Under the null hypothesis that these elasticities vary by industry but not by the year in which the contract was signed, a set of fixed effects for the different years of the sample should be insignificant in a regression that includes fixed effects by industry. The F statistics for this null hypothesis are reported in the second row of Table 5 . The probability values of the test statistics are of the order of 3 percent, indicating some evidence against the null. The pattern of the estimated year effects points to an increase in elasticities within each industry between 1968 and 1975. The trend is uneven, however: relative to 1975 contracts, contracts signed in 1968, 1969, 1972, and 1973 had elasticities some 6 to 15 percent lower, whereas contracts in other years had about the same elasticities.
The next row of the table presents F statistics for the joint significance of a set of fixed effects by union.34 Since only a few unions organize workers outside of one or 34The unions included were the UAW, the USW, Teamsters, the IAM, the Carpenters, the Retail, Wholesale and Bakery Workers, the Food and Commercial Workers, the Electrical and Radio Workers, and OCAW. 
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Fixed Effects (probability value) 4. F-ratio for 2 ContractLength Fixed Effects (probability value) 5. t-ratio for New COLA Fixed Effect (probability value) two industries, the number of fixed effects bv union that can be estimated is low. The test statistics are uniformly insignificant at conventional levels; thus, it does not seem possible to isolate union-specific effects on the marginal elasticity of contractual wages with respect to prices, after controlling for industry. 35 The last two rows of Table 5 reDort the results for significance tests of two alternative sets of viriables that explain deviations of escalation elasticities from three-digit industrv means. The first set of variables comprises fixed effects for contract length. The test statistics offer no evidence to suggest that contract length is an important determinant of the intra-industry dispersion in marginal elasticities of indexation. The second variable is an indicator of whether the escalation clause is a new feature in the contract. Again, there is no evidence that differences in escalation elasticities within industries are correlated S5This result is robust to the level of disaggregation of industry effects. Including only 19 fixed effects by industry group, fixed effects by union are still insignificant in explaining elasticities of indexation.
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with the past experience of the bargaining unit in designing cost-of-living provisions. Table 6 completes this analysis of the interindustry pattern of marginal escalation elasticities by identifying the industries with the highest and lowest marginal elasticities of The i n d e x a t i~n .~~ highelasticity group is composed mainly of textile industries and service industries, with two metal fabricating industries and electric utilities also included. The lowelasticity group is less homogeneous, including several durable manufacturing industries, as well as tobacco products, paper bag and box producers, and automobile transport. As the table suggests, service industries are overrepresented among the high-elasticity group. In fact, the only service industry with an industry-specific mean elasticity less than the all-industries mean is the automobile transport industry, which has strong economic ties to the automobile assembly industry. On the other hand, most durable manufacturing 36The rankings are based on the elasticity of base wages. Rankings on the basis of any of the marginal elasticity measures are very similar.
industries, including the basic iron and steel industries and durable consumer goods industries, have mean elasticities below or equal to the all-industries mean. Summary and Implications Escalation clauses in long-term labor contracts have a number of features that are not predicted by simple theoretical models of indexation. Among these are sizable noncontingent increases, which often appear in combination with restrictions on the range of wage and price changes covered by indexation, and escalation formulas that provide for equal absolute wage increases to skilled and unskilled workers. Although a complete model of indexation in long-term contracts would necessarily account for these features, it is nonetheless useful to provide an interpretive link between the observed provisions and the escalation formulas that arise from the simple models.
The framework developed in this paper suggests that it is possible to extract from a particular escalation clause the ex ante desired responsiveness of wages to prices, by calculating the marginal elasticity of indexation when the escalator is operative. Measures of the marginal elasticity of indexation are found to have a wide dispersion across contracts. In the sample of contracts studied, the marginal elasticity of indexation of base wage rates ranges from a low of .70 or less in contracts in durable manufacturing industries to a high of 1.3 or more in some contracts in service industries and textile industries.
In contrast to measures of the marginal elasticity of indexation, measures of the total yield of escalator provisions depend on both the responsiveness of wages to prices during indexation and on the range of wage and price increases over which the escalator is operative. Restrictions that delay the start of indexation or limit the maximum escalated wage increase are found to be fairly common among indexed labor contracts. As a result, the total increase in wages that results from escalation, as a fraction of total price increases over the life of the contract, is typically smaller than the actual elasticity of indexation when the escalator is operative. The ratio of realized escalated wage increases to price increases during the contract period is an incomplete characterization of escalation provisions and provides no information on the desired ex ante responsiveness of wages to prices, in general.
An analysis of the variation in marginal elasticities indicates that interindustry differences in mean elasticities are a major source of the total dispersion in measured elasticities. On the other hand, the effects of different unions and different contract durations are judged to be insignificant determinants of the intra-industry dispersion of escalation elasticities. There is some evidence of a trend toward increasing elasticities of escalation over the 1967 -75 period, however.
The implications of this pattern of escalation elasticities are twofold. First, a simple model of complete real wage insurance via unit-elastic indexation is rejected by the data.37 Likewise, models that predict elasticities to be uniformly less than unity are clearlv at variance with the facts.38 Second, [he interindustry dispersion of S7This is a prediction of the early literature on implicit contracts. See, for example, Costas Azariadis, "Implicit Contracts and Underemployment Equilibria," Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 83, No. 6 (December 1975 ), pp. 1183 -1202 3BIndexation elasticities between zero and unity are elasticities provides an obvious testing ground for theoretical models of indexation. To the extent that the implications of contract-theoretic models of the labor market have proved elusive under empirical scrutiny, the opportunity to test their predictive content against the pattern of escalation elasticities across industries is a valuable one.
predicted by models like that in Gray, "Wage Indexation: A Macroeconomic Approach."
